APPENDIX A
GENERAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
ACADEMIC TENURE (1915)*
I
GENERAL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

The term "academic freedom" has traditionally had two applications-to
the freedom of the teacher and to that of the student, Lehrfreiheit and
Lernfreiheit. It need scarcely be pointed out that the freedom which is the
subject of this report is that of the teacher. Academic freedom in this sense
comprises three elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of
teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extra-mural
utterance and action. The first of these is almost everywhere so safeguarded
that the dangers of its infringement are slight. It may therefore be
disregarded in this report. The second and third phases of academic freedom
are closely related, and are often not distinguished. The third, however, has
an importance of its own, since of late it has perhaps more frequently been the
occasion of difficulties and controversies than has the question of freedom of
intra-academic teaching. All five of the cases which have recently been
investigated by committees of this Association have involved, at least as one
factor, the right of university teachers to express their opinions freely outside
the university or to engage in political activities in their capacity as citizens.
The general principles which have to do with freedom of teaching in both
these senses seem to the committee to be in great part, though not wholly, the
same. In this report, therefore, we shall consider the matter primarily with
reference to freedom of teaching within the university, and shall assume that
what is said thereon is also applicable to the freedom of speech of university
teachers outside their institutions, subject to certain qualifications and
supplementary considerations which will be pointed out in the course of the
report.
An adequate discussion of academic freedom must necessarily consider
three matters: (1) the scope and basis of the power exercised by those bodies
having ultimate legal authority in academic affairs; (2) the nature of the
academic calling; (3) the function of the academic institution or university.

* Reprinted, with permission of the American Association of University Professors, from 1
AAUP Bull 17 (1915).
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1. Basis of Academic Authority
American institutions of learning are usually controlled by boards of
trustees as the ultimate repositories of power. Upon them finally it devolves
to determine the measure of academic freedom which is to be realized in the
several institutions. It therefore becomes necessary to inquire into the nature
of the trust reposed in these boards, and to ascertain to whom the trustees are
to be considered accountable.
The simplest case is that of a proprietary school or college designed for
the propagation of specific doctrines prescribed by those who have furnished
its endowment. It is evident that in such cases the trustees are bound by the
deed of gift, and, whatever be their own views, are obligated to carry out the
terms of the trust. If a church or religious denomination establishes a college
to be governed by a board of trustees, with the express understanding that the
college will be used as an instrument of propaganda in the interests of the
religious faith professed by the church or denomination creating it, the
trustees have a right to demand that everything be subordinated to that end.
If, again, as has happened in this country, a wealthy manufacturer establishes
a special school in a University in order to teach, among other things, the
advantages of a protective tariff, or if, as is also the case, an institution has
been endowed for the purpose of propagating the doctrines of socialism, the
situation is analogous. All of these are essentially proprietary institutions, in
the moral sense. They do not, at least as regards one particular subject,
accept the principles of freedom of inquiry, of opinion, and of teaching; and
their purpose is not to advance knowledge by the unrestricted research and
unfettered discussion of impartial investigators, but rather to subsidize the
promotion of opinions held by the persons, usually not of the scholar's
calling, who provide the funds for their maintenance. Concerning the
desirability of the existence of such institutions, the committee does not
desire to express any opinion. But it is manifestly important that they should
not be permitted to sail under false colors. Genuine boldness and
thoroughness of inquiry, and freedom of speech, are scarcely reconcilable
with the prescribed inculcation of a particular opinion upon a controverted
question.
Such institutions are rare, however, and are becoming ever more rare. We
still have, indeed, colleges under denominational auspices; but very few of
them impose upon their trustees responsibility for the spread of specific
doctrines. They are more and more coming to occupy, with respect to the
freedom enjoyed by the members of their teaching bodies, the position of
untrammeled institutions of learning, and are differentiated only by the
natural influence of their respective historic antecedents and traditions.
Leaving aside, then, the small number of institutions of the proprietary
type, what is the nature of the trust reposed in the governing boards of the
ordinary institutions of learning? Can colleges and universities that are not
strictly bound by their founders to a propagandist duty ever be included in the
class of institutions that we have just described as being in a moral sense
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proprietary? The answer is clear. If the former class of institutions constitute
a private or proprietary trust, the latter constitute a public trust. The trustees
are trustees for the public. In the case of our state universities this is selfevident. In the case of most of our privately endowed institutions, the
situation is really not different. They cannot be permitted to assume the
proprietary attitude and privilege, if they are appealing to the general public
for support. Trustees of such universities or colleges have no moral right to
bind the reason or the conscience of any professor. All claim to such right is
waived by the appeal to the general public for contributions and for moral
support in the maintenance, not of a propaganda, but of a non-partisan
institution of learning. It follows that any university which lays restrictions
upon the intellectual freedom of its professors proclaims itself a proprietary
institution, and should be so described whenever it makes a general appeal for
funds; and the public should be advised that the institution has no claim
whatever to general support or regard.
This elementary distinction between a private and a public trust is not yet
so universally accepted as it should be in our American institutions. While in
many universities and colleges the situation has come to be entirely
satisfactory, there are others in which the relation of trustees to professors is
apparently still conceived to be analogous to that of a private employer to his
employees; in which, therefore, trustees are not regarded as debarred by any
moral restrictions, beyond their own sense of expediency, from imposing
their personal opinions upon the teaching of the institution, or even from
employing the power of dismissal to gratify their private antipathies or
resentments. An eminent university president thus described the situation
not many years since:
In the institutions of higher education the board of trustees is the body on whose
discretion, good feeling, and experience the securing of academic freedom now
depends. There are boards which leave nothing to be desired in these respects; but
there are also numerous bodies that have everything to learn with regard to academic
freedom. These barbarous boards exercise an arbitrary power of dismissal. They
exclude from the teachings of the university unpopular or dangerous subjects. In
some states they even treat professors' positions as common political spoils; and all
too frequently, both in state and endowed institutions, they fail to treat the members
of the teaching staff with that high consideration to which their functions entitle
them.'

It is, then, a prerequisite to a realization of the proper measure of academic
freedom in American institutions of learning, that all boards of trustees
should understand-as many already do-the full implications of the
distinction between private proprietorship and a public trust.

1. From "Academic Freedom," an address delivered before the New York Chapter of the Phi
Beta Kappa Society at Cornell University, May 29, 1907, by Charles William Eliot, LL.D., President
of Harvard University.
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The Nature of the Academic Calling

The above-mentioned conception of a university as an ordinary business
venture, and of academic teaching as a purely private employment, manifests
also a radical failure to apprehend the nature of the social function discharged
by the professional scholar. While we should be reluctant to believe that any
large number of educated persons suffer from such a misapprehension, it
seems desirable at this time to restate clearly the chief reasons, lying in the
nature of the university teaching profession, why it is to the public interest
that the professorial office should be one both of dignity and of
independence.
If education is the corner stone of the structure of society and if progress
in scientific knowledge is essential to civilization, few things can be more
important than to enhance the dignity of the scholar's profession, with a view
to attracting into its ranks men of the highest ability, of sound learning, and of

strong and independent character. This is the more essential because the
pecuiiiary emoluments of the profession are not, and doubtless never will be,
equal to those open to the more successful members of other professions. It
is not, in our opinion, desirable that men should be drawn into this profession
by the magnitude of the economic rewards which it offers; but it is for this
reason the more needful that men of high gift and character should be drawn
into it by the assurance of an honorable and secure position, and of freedom
to perform honestly and according to their own consciences the distinctive
and important function which the nature of the profession lays upon them.
That function is to deal at first hand, after prolonged and specialized
technical training, with the sources of knowledge; and to impart the results of
their own and of their fellow-specialists' investigations and reflection, both to
students and to the general public, without fear or favor. The proper
discharge of this function requires (among other things) that the university
teacher shall be exempt from any pecuniary motive or inducement to hold, or
to express, any conclusion which is not the genuine and uncolored product of
his own study or that of fellow-specialists. Indeed, the proper fulfillment of
the work of the professorate requires that our universities shall be so free that
no fair-minded person shall find any excuse for even a suspicion that the
utterances of university teachers are shaped or restricted by the judgment, not
of professional scholars, but of inexpert and possibly not wholly disinterested
persons outside of their ranks. The lay public is under no compulsion to
accept or to act upon the opinions of the scientific experts whom, through the
universities, it employs. But it is highly needful, in the interest of society at
large, that what purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and
dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall in fact be the conclusions of such men,
and not echoes of the opinions of the lay public, or of the individuals who
endow or manage universities. To the degree that professional scholars, in
the formation and promulgation of their opinions, are, or by the character of
their tenure appear to be, subject to any motive other than their own scientific
conscience and a desire for the respect of their fellow-experts, to that degree
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the university teaching profession is corrupted; its proper influence upon
public opinion is diminished and vitiated; and society at large fails to get from
its scholars, in an unadulterated form, the peculiar and necessary service
which it is the office of the professional scholar to furnish.
These considerations make still more clear the nature of the relationship
between university trustees and members of university faculties. The latter
are the appointees, but not in any proper sense the employees, of the former.
For, once appointed, the scholar has professional functions to perform in
which the appointing authorities have neither competency nor moral right to
intervene. The responsibility of the university teacher is primarily to the
public itself, and to the judgment of his own profession; and while, with
respect to certain external conditions of his vocation, he accepts a
responsibility to the authorities of the institution in which he serves, in the
essentials of his professional activity his duty is to the wider public to which
the institution itself is morally amenable. So far as the university teacher's
independence of thought and utterance is concerned-though not in other
regards-the relationship of professor to trustees may be compared to that
between judges of the Federal courts and the Executive who appoints them.
University teachers should be understood to be, with respect to the
conclusions reached and expressed by them, no more subject to the control of
the trustees, than are judges subject to the control of the President, with
respect to their decisions; while of course, for the same reason, trustees are no
more to be held responsible for, or to be presumed to agree with, the
opinions or utterances of professors, than the President can be assumed to
approve of all the legal reasonings of the courts. A university is a great and
indispensable organ of the higher life of a civilized community, in the work of
which the trustees hold an essential and highly honorable place, but in which
the faculties hold an independent place, with quite equal responsibilities-and
in relation to purely scientific and educational questions, the primary
responsibility. Misconception or obscurity in this matter has undoubtedly
been a source of occasional difficulty in the past, and even in several instances
during the current year, however much, in the main, a long tradition of kindly
and courteous intercourse between trustees and members of university
faculties has kept the question in the background.
3.

The Function of the Academic Institution

The importance of academic freedom is most clearly perceived in the light
of the purposes for which universities exist. These are three in number:
A. To promote inquiry and advance the sum of human knowledge.
B. To provide general instruction to the students.
C. To develop experts for various branches of the public service.
Let us consider each of these. In the earlier stages of a nation's intellectual
development, the chief concern of educational institutions is to train the
growing generation and to diffuse the already accepted knowledge. It is only
slowly that there comes to be provided in the highest institutions of learning
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the opportunity for the gradual wresting from nature of her intimate secrets.
The modern university is becoming more and more the home of scientific
research. There are three fields of human inquiry in which the race is only at
the beginning: natural science, social science, and philosophy and religion,
dealing with the relations of man to outer nature, to his fellow men, and to the
ultimate realities and values. In natural science all that we have learned but
serves to make us realize more deeply how much more remains to be
discovered. In social science in its largest sense, which is concerned with the
relations of men in society and with the conditions of social order and wellbeing, we have learned only an adumbration of the laws which govern these
vastly complex phenomena. Finally, in the spirit life, and in the interpretation
of the general meaning and ends of human existence and its relation to the
universe, we are still far from a comprehension of the final truths, and from a
universal agreement among all sincere and earnest men. In all of these
domains of knowledge, the first condition of progress is complete and
unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results. Such freedom is
the breath in the nostrils of all scientific activity.
The second function-which for a long time was the only function-of the
American college or university is to provide instruction for students. It is
scarcely open to question that freedom of utterance is as important to the
teacher as it is to the investigator. No man can be a successful teacher unless
he enjoys the respect of his students, and their confidence in his intellectual
integrity. It is clear, however, that this confidence will be impaired if there is
suspicion on the part of the student that the teacher is not expressing himself
fully or frankly, or that college and university teachers in general are a
repressed and intimidated class who dare not speak with that candor and
courage which youth always demands in those whom it is to esteem. The
average student is a discerning observer, who soon takes the measure of his
instructor. It is not only the character of the instruction but also the character
of the instructor that counts; and if the student has reason to believe that the
instructor is not true to himself, the virtue of the instruction as an educative
force is incalculably diminished. There must be in the mind of the teacher no
mental reservation. He must give the student the best of what he has and
what he is.
The third function of the modern university is to develop experts for the
use of the community. If there is one thing that distinguishes the more recent
developments of democracy, it is the recognition by legislators of the inherent
complexities of economic, social, and political life, and the difficulty of solving
problems of technical adjustment without technical knowledge. The
recognition of this fact has led to a continually greater demand for the aid of
experts in these subjects, to advise both legislators and administrators. The
training of such experts has, accordingly, in recent years, become an
important part of the work of the universities; and in almost every one of our
higher institutions of learning the professors of the economic, social, and
political sciences have been drafted to an increasing extent into more or less
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unofficial participation in the public service. It is obvious that here again the
scholar must be absolutely free not only to pursue his investigations but to
declare the results of his researches, no matter where they may lead him or to
what extent they may come into conflict with accepted opinion. To be of use
to the legislator or the administrator, he must enjoy their complete confidence
in the disinterestedness of his conclusions.
It is clear, then, that the university cannot perform its threefold function
without accepting and enforcing to the fullest extent the principle of academic
freedom. The responsibility of the university as a whole is to the community
at large, and any restriction upon the freedom of the instructor is bound to
react injuriously upon the efficiency and the morale of the institution, and
therefore ultimately upon the interests of the community.
The attempted infringements of academic freedom at present are probably
not only of less frequency than, but of a different character from, those to be
found in former times. In the early period of university development in
America the chief menace to academic freedom was ecclesiastical, and the
disciplines chiefly affected were philosophy and the natural sciences. In more
recent times the danger zone has been shifted to the political and social
sciences-though we still have sporadic examples of the former class of cases
in some of our smaller institutions. But it is precisely in these provinces of
knowledge in which academic freedom is now most likely to be threatened,
that the need for it is at the same time most evident. No person of intelligence
believes that all of our political problems have been solved, or that the final
stage of social evolution has been reached. Grave issues in the adjustment of
men's social and economic relations are certain to call for settlement in the
years that are to come; and for the right settlement of them mankind will need
all the wisdom, all the good will, all the soberness of mind, and all the
knowledge drawn from experience, that it can command. Towards this
settlement the university has potentially its own very great contribution to
make; for if the adjustment reached is to be a wise one, it must take due
account of economic science, and be guided by that breadth of historic vision
which it should be one of the functions of a university to cultivate. But if the
universities are to render any such service towards the right solution of the
social problems of the future, it is the first essential that the scholars who
carry on the work of universities shall not be in a position of dependence
upon the favor of any social class or group, that the disinterestedness and
impartiality of their inquiries and their conclusions shall be, so far as is
humanly possible, beyond the reach of suspicion.
The special dangers to freedom of teaching in the domain of the social
sciences are evidently two. The one which is the more likely to affect the
privately endowed colleges and universities is the danger of restrictions upon
the expression of opinions which point towards extensive social innovations,
or call in question the moral legitimacy or social expediency of economic
conditions or commercial practices in which large vested interests are
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involved. In the political, social, and economic field almost every question, no
matter how large and general it at first appears, is more or less affected with
private or class interests; and, as the governing body of a university is
naturally made up of men who through their standing and ability are
personally interested in great private enterprises, the points of possible
conflict are numberless. When to this is added the consideration that
benefactors, as well as most of the parents who send their children to privately
endowed institutions, themselves belong to the more prosperous and
therefore usually to the more conservative classes, it is apparent that, so long
as effectual safeguards for academic freedom are not established, there is a
real danger that pressure from vested interests may, sometimes deliberately
and sometimes unconsciously, sometimes openly and sometimes subtly and in
obscure ways, be brought to bear upon academic authorities.
On the other hand, in our state universities the danger may be the reverse.
Where the university is dependent for funds upon legislative favor, it has
sometimes happened that the conduct of the institution has been affected by
political considerations; and where there is a definite governmental policy or a
strong public feeling on economic, social, or political questions, the menace
to academic freedom may consist in the repression of opinions that in the
particular political situation are deemed ultra-conservative rather than ultraradical. The essential point, however, is not so much that the opinion is of
one or another shade, as that it differs from the views entertained by the
authorities. The question resolves itself into one of departure from accepted
standards; whether the departure is in the one direction or the other is
immaterial.
This brings us to the most serious difficulty of this problem; namely, the
dangers connected with the existence in a democracy of an overwhelming and
concentrated public opinion. The tendency of modern democracy is for men
to think alike, to feel alike, and to speak alike. Any departure from the
conventional standards is apt to be regarded with suspicion. Public opinion is
at once the chief safeguard of a democracy, and the chief menace to the real
liberty of the individual. It almost seems as if the danger of despotism cannot
be wholly averted under any form of government. In a political autocracy
there is no effective public opinion, and all are subject to the tyranny of the
ruler; in a democracy there is political freedom, but there is likely to be a
tyranny of public opinion.
An inviolable refuge from such tyranny should be found in the university.
It should be an intellectual experiment station, where new ideas may
germinate and where their fruit, though still distasteful to the community as a
whole, may be allowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it may become a part
of the accepted intellectual food of the nation or of the world. Not less is it a
distinctive duty of the university to be the conservator of all genuine elements
of value in the past thought and life of mankind which are not in the fashion of
the moment. Though it need not be the "home of beaten causes," the
university is, indeed, likely always to exercise a certain form of conservative
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influence. For by its nature it is committed to the principle that knowledge
should precede action, to the caution (by no means synonymous with
intellectual timidity) which is an essential part of the scientific method, to a
sense of the complexity of social problems, to the practice of taking long views
into the future, and to a reasonable regard for the teachings of experience.
One of its most characteristic functions in a democratic society is to help make
public opinion more self-critical and more circumspect, to check the more
hasty and unconsidered impulses of popular feeling, to train the democracy to
the habit of looking before and after. It is precisely this function of the
university which is most injured by any restriction upon academic freedom;
and it is precisely those who most value this aspect of the university's work
who should most earnestly protest against any such restriction. For the public
may respect, and be influenced by, the counsels of prudence and of
moderation which are given by men of science, if it believes those counsels to
be the disinterested expression of the scientific temper and of unbiased
inquiry. It is little likely to respect or heed them if it has reason to believe that
they are the expression of the interests, or the timidities, of the limited
portion of the community which is in a position to endow institutions of
learning, or is most likely to be represented upon their boards of trustees.
And a plausible reason for this belief is given the public so long as our
universities are not organized in such a way as to make impossible any
exercise of pressure upon professorial opinions and utterances by governing
boards of laymen.
Since there are no rights without corresponding duties, the considerations
heretofore set down with respect to the freedom of the academic teacher
entail certain correlative obligations. The claim to freedom of teaching is
made in the interest of the integrity and of the progress of scientific inquiry; it,
is, therefore, only those who carry on their work in the temper of the scientific
inquirer who may justly assert this claim. The liberty of the scholar within the
university to set forth his conclusions, be they what they may, is conditioned
by their being conclusions gained by a scholar's method and held in a
scholar's spirit; that is to say, they must be the fruits of competent and patient
and sincere inquiry, and they should be set forth with dignity, courtesy, and
temperateness of language. The university teacher, in giving instruction upon
controversial matters, while he is under no obligation to hide his own opinion
under a mountain of equivocal verbiage, should, if he is fit for his position, be
a person of a fair and judicial mind; he should, in dealing with such subjects,
set forth justly, without suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of
other investigators; he should cause his students to become familiar with the
best published expressions of the great historic types of doctrine upon the
questions at issue; and he should, above all, remember that his business is not
to provide his students with ready-made conclusions, but to train them to
think for themselves, and to provide them access to those materials which they
need if they are to think intelligently.
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It is, however, for reasons which have already been made evident,
inadmissible that the power of determining when departures from the
requirements of the scientific spirit and method have occurred, should be
vested in bodies not composed of members of the academic profession. Such
bodies necessarily lack full competency to judge of those requirements; their
intervention can never be exempt from the suspicion that it is dictated by
other motives than zeal for the integrity of science; and it is, in any case,
unsuitable to the dignity of a great profession that the initial responsibility for
the maintenance of its professional standards should not be in the hands of its
own members. It follows that university teachers must be prepared to assume
this responsibility for themselves. They have hitherto seldom had the
opportunity, or perhaps the disposition, to do so. The obligation will
doubtless, therefore, seem to many an unwelcome and burdensome one; and
for its proper discharge members of the profession will perhaps need to
acquire, in a greater measure than they at present possess it, the capacity for
impersonal judgment in such cases, and for judicial severity when the
occasion requires it. But the responsibility cannot, in this committee's
opinion, be rightfully evaded. If this profession should prove itself unwilling
to purge its ranks of the incompetent and the unworthy, or to prevent the
freedom which it claims in the name of science from being used as a shelter
for inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical and intemperate
partisanship, it is certain that the task will be performed by others-by others
who lack certain essential qualifications for performing it, and whose action is
sure to breed suspicions and recurrent controversies deeply injurious to the
internal order and the public standing of universities. Your committee has,
therefore, in the appended "Practical Proposals" attempted to suggest means
by which judicial action by representatives of the profession, with respect to
the matters here referred to, may be secured.
There is one case in which the academic teacher is under an obligation to
observe certain special restraints-namely, the instruction of immature
students. In many of our American colleges, and especially in the first two
years of the course, the student's character is not yet fully formed, his mind is
still relatively immature. In these circumstances it may reasonably be
expected that the instructor will present scientific truth with discretion, that
he will introduce the student to new conceptions gradually, with some
consideration for the student's preconceptions and traditions, and with due
regard to character-building. The teacher ought also to be especially on his
guard against taking unfair advantage of the student's immaturity by
indoctrinating him with the teacher's own opinions before the student has had
an opportunity fairly to examine other opinions upon the matters in question,
and before he has sufficient knowledge and ripeness of judgment to be
entitled to form any definitive opinion of his own. It is not the least service
which a college or university may render to those under its instruction, to
habituate them to looking not only patiently but methodically on both sides,
before adopting any conclusion upon controverted issues. By these
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suggestions, however, it need scarcely be said that the committee does not
intend to imply that it is not the duty of an academic instructor to give to any
students old enough to be in college a genuine intellectual awakening and to
arouse in them a keen desire to reach personally verified conclusions upon all
questions of general concernment to mankind, or of special significance for
their own time. There is much truth in some remarks recently made in this
connection by a college president:
Certain professors have been refused reelection lately, apparently because they set
their students to thinking in ways objectionable to the trustees. It would be well if
more teachers were dismissed because they fail to stimulate thinking of any kind. We
can afford to forgive a college professor what we regard as the occasional error of his
doctrine, especially as we may be wrong, provided he is a contagious center of
intellectual enthusiasm. It is better for students to think about heresies than not to
think at all; better for them to climb new trails, and stumble over error if need be, than
to ride forever in upholstered ease in the overcrowded highway. It is a primary duty of
a teacher to make a student take an honest account of his stock of ideas, throw out the
dead matter, place
revised price marks on what is left, and try to fill his empty shelves
2
with new goods.

It is, however, possible and necessary that such intellectual awakening be
brought about with patience, considerateness and pedagogical wisdom.
There is one further consideration with regard to the class-room
utterances of college and university teachers to which the committee thinks it
important to call the attention of members of the profession, and of
administrative authorities. Such utterances ought always to be considered
privileged communications. Discussions in the class room ought not to be
supposed to be utterances for the public at large. They are often designed to
provoke opposition or arouse debate. It has, unfortunately, sometimes
happened in this country that sensational newspapers have quoted and
garbled such remarks. As a matter of common law, it is clear that the
utterances of an academic instructor are privileged, and may not be
published, in whole or part, without his authorization. But our practice,
unfortunately, still differs from that of foreign countries, and no effective
check has in this country been put upon such unauthorized and often
misleading publication. It is much to be desired that test cases should be
3
made of any infractions of the rule.
In their extra-mural utterances, it is obvious that academic teachers are
under a peculiar obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or exaggerated
statements, and to refrain from intemperate or sensational modes of
expression. But, subject to these restraints, it is not, in this committee's
opinion, desirable that scholars should be debarred from giving expression to
their judgments upon controversial questions, or that their freedom of
2. President William T. Foster in The Nation, November 11, 1915.
3. The leading case is Abernethy vs. Hutchison, 3 L. J., Ch. 209. In this case where damages
were awarded the court held as follows: "That persons who are admitted as pupils or otherwise to
hear these lectures, although they are orally delivered and the parties might go to the extent, if they
were able to do so, of putting down the whole by means of shorthand, yet they can do that only for
the purpose of their own information and could not publish, for profit, that which they had not
obtained the right of selling."
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speech, outside the university, should be limited to questions falling within
their own specialties. It is clearly not proper that they should be prohibited
from lending their active support to organized movements which they believe
to be in the public interest. And, speaking broadly, it may be said in the
words of a non-academic body already once quoted in a publication of this
Association, that "it is neither possible nor desirable to deprive a college
' 4
professor of the political rights vouchsafed to every citizen.
It is, however, a question deserving of consideration by members of this
Association, and by university officials, how far academic teachers, at least
those dealing with political, economic and social subjects, should be
prominent in the management of our great party organizations, or should be
candidates for state or national offices of a distinctly political character. It is
manifestly desirable that such teachers have minds untrammeled by party
loyalties, unexcited by party enthusiasms, and unbiased by personal political
ambitions; and that universities should remain uninvolved in party
antagonisms. On the other hand, it is equally manifest that the material
available for the service of the State would be restricted in a highly
undesirable way, if it were understood that no member of the academic
profession should ever be called upon to assume the responsibilities of public
office. This question may, in the committee's opinion, suitably be made a
topic for special discussion at some future meeting of this Association, in
order that a practical policy, which shall do justice to the two partially
conflicting considerations that bear upon the matter, may be agreed upon.
It is, it will be seen, in no sense the contention of this committee that
academic freedom implies that individual teachers should be exempt from all
restraints as to the matter or manner of their utterances, either within or
without the university. Such restraints as are necessary should in the main,
your committee holds, be self-imposed, or enforced by the public opinion of
the profession. But there may, undoubtedly, arise occasional cases in which
the aberrations of individuals may require to be checked by definite
disciplinary action. What this report chiefly maintains is that such action can
not with safety be taken by bodies not composed of members of the academic
profession. Lay governing boards are competent to judge concerning charges
of habitual neglect of assigned duties, on the part of individual teachers, and
concerning charges of grave moral delinquency. But in matters of opinion,
and of the utterance of opinion, such boards can not intervene without
destroying, to the extent of their intervention, the essential nature of a
university-without converting it from a place dedicated to openness of mind,
in which the conclusions expressed are the tested conclusions of trained
scholars, into a place barred against the access of new light, and
precommitted to the opinions or prejudices of men who have not been set
apart or expressly trained for the scholar's duties. It is, in short, not the
absolute freedom of utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute
4.
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DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion and of teaching, of the academic
profession, that is asserted by this declaration of principles. It is conceivable
that our profession may prove unworthy of its high calling, and unfit to
exercise the responsibilities that belong to it. But it will scarcely be said as yet
to have given evidence of such unfitness. And the existence of this
Association, as it seems to your committee, must be construed as a pledge,
not only that the profession will earnestly guard those liberties without which
it can not rightly render its distinctive and indispensable service to society, but
also that it will with equal earnestness seek to maintain such standards of
professional character, and of scientific integrity and competency, as shall
make it a fit instrument for that service.
II
PRACTICAL PROPOSALS

As the foregoing declaration implies, the ends to be accomplished are
chiefly three:
First: To safeguard freedom of inquiry and of teaching against both covert
and overt attacks, by providing suitable judicial bodies, composed of members
of the academic profession, which may be called into action before university
teachers are dismissed or disciplined, and may determine in what cases the
question of academic freedom is actually involved.
Second: By the same means, to protect college executives and governing
boards against unjust charges of infringement of academic freedom, or of
arbitrary and dictatorial conduct-charges which, when they gain wide
currency and belief, are highly detrimental to the good repute and the
influence of universities.
Third: To render the profession more attractive to men of high ability and
strong personality by insuring the dignity, the independence, and the
reasonable security of tenure, of the professorial office. The measures which
it is believed to be necessary for our universities to adopt to realize these
ends-measures which have already been adopted in part by some
institutions-are four:
A. Action by Faculty Committees on Reappointments. Official action relating to
reappointments and refusals of reappointment should be taken only with the
advice and consent of some board or committee representative of the faculty.
Your committee does not desire to make at this time any suggestion as to the
manner of selection of such boards.
B. Definition of Tenure of Office. In every institution there should be an
unequivocal understanding as to the term of each appointment; and the
tenure of professorships and associate professorships, and of all positions
above the grade of instructor after ten years of service, should be permanent
(subject to the provisions hereinafter given for removal upon charges). In
those state universities which are legally incapable of making contracts for
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more than a limited period, the governing boards should announce their
policy with respect to the presumption of reappointment in the several classes
of position, and such announcements, though not legally enforceable, should
be regarded as morally binding. No university teacher of any rank should,
except in cases of grave moral delinquency, receive notice of dismissal or of
refusal of reappointment, later than three months before the close of any
academic year, and in the case of teachers above the grade of instructor, one
year's notice should be given.
C. Formulation of Grounds for Dismissal. In every institution the grounds
which will be regarded as justifying the dismissal of members of the faculty
should be formulated with reasonable definiteness; and in the case of
institutions which impose upon their faculties doctrinal standards of a
sectarian or partisan character, these standards should be clearly defined and
the body or individual having authority to interpret them, in case of
controversy, should be designated. Your committee does not think it best at
this time to attempt to enumerate the legitimate grounds for dismissal,
believing it to be preferable that individual institutions should take the
initiative in this.
D. Judicial Hearings Before Dismissal. Every university or college teacher
should be entitled, before dismissal 5 or demotion, to have the charges against
him stated in writing in specific terms and to have a fair trial on those charges
before a special or permanent judicial committee chosen by the faculty senate
or council, or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher accused should
have full opportunity to present evidence, and, if the charge is one of
professional incompetency, a formal report upon his work should be first
made in writing by the teachers of his own department and of cognate
departments in the university, and, if the teacher concerned so desire, by a
committee of his fellow specialists from other institutions, appointed by some
competent authority.

5. This does not refer to refusals of reappointment at the expiration of the terms of office of
teachers below the rank of associate professor. All such questions of reappointment should, as above
provided, be acted upon by a faculty committee.

